By Kathleen L. Slaney Timothy P. Racine
This edited quantity contains contributions from across the world well known specialists within the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It applies his later philosophy to concrete matters relating the integrity of medical claims in a extensive spectrum of study domain names inside modern psychology.
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Additional info for A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Use of Conceptual Analysis in Psychology
By the same token, there is no such thing as knowing, being right, being sure or certain, and finding out, learning or detecting. Although there is such a thing as introspection, it is not a kind of inner sense (or ‘apperception’ as Leibniz denominated it). It is either a form of self-reflection characteristic of introspective personalities like Proust, or a matter of registering how things are with one (as when one keeps a diary of one’s pains for the doctor). The limits of thought are the limits of the behavioural expression of thought.
This was the object of much of Wittgenstein’s writing on the philosophy of psychology after 1946, although the topic had already caught his attention in the Tractatus remarks on the Necker cube. I shall say no more about this splendid array of problems, since the subject is discussed in detail in the essay ‘Aspect Seeing in Wittgenstein and in Psychology’ by Nicole Hausen and Michel ter Hark. They show vividly how Wittgenstein’s reflections bring to light conceptual deficiencies in empirical psychology.
This is the aim of clarificatory philosophy. 112). This is to realize – as Wittgenstein did throughout his career – that ‘Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. 111). It is against this backdrop that we can appreciate how and why Wittgenstein sums up his attitude to science in the following quotation: I may find scientific questions interesting, but they never really grip me. Only conceptual and aesthetic questions do that. At bottom I am indifferent to the solution of scientific problems; but not the other sort.
A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Use of Conceptual Analysis in Psychology by Kathleen L. Slaney Timothy P. Racine